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Tangier Sound Waterman's Association v. Douglas:
CHESAPEAKE BAY BLUE CRAB RESIDENCY
RESTRICTIONS HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL

By Alison Rieser and Nancy Ziegler

A recent federal district court decision, Tangier Sound Waterman's Association v. Douglas, 1 reopened the debate on a fundamental issue of marine resource management: under what circumstances will a state have the authority to limit access by
nonresidents to fisheries found within its boundaries?
The Tangier Sound Waterman's Association brought suit in
March, 1981 against the Commonwealth of Virginia, its marine

resources commission and the Commissioner, James E.
Douglas, Jr., challenging state licensing laws which denied
nonresidents the right to commercially harvest blue crab in
Virginia waters of the Chesapeake Bay/ The plaintiffs were
commercial crab fishermen who reside on an .island within the
Bay which is bisected by the boundary between Virginia and
Maryland. 1 Because of Virginia's residency restrictions, these
fishermen were unable to pursue their migratory catch across
the state border into Virginia waters. This prohibiti.on shortened
the fishing season for Maryland crabbers, since the crabs are
plentiful in Maryland waters only during summer months. 4 The
Maryland Department of Natural Resources intervened as a party defendant on the grounds that it was responsible for
upholding a similar statutory scheme in Maryland and that it
would be adversely affected by a decision striking down the
Virginia residency laws.')

*

Reprinted from 'l'lie Territorial Sea, Vol JI, No. 2 (1982),
courtesy of The Marine Law lllstitute, Universi(y of Sout/Jem

1\lah1e, 2,16 Deering Ave., Portland, ME 04102.

'541 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Va. 1982).
'The plainliffs broughl a civil action seeking declarative and injunctive relief from the following Virginia Jaws: VA. CoDE § 28.1-165
(1979) provides that residents of Virginia n'l.ust obtain licenses from the
Virginia Marine Resources Commission to commercially harvest blue
crabs. There is no limit on the number of such licenses which may be
granted to residents of the state. Under VA. CODE§ 28.1-57 (1979), it is
a misdemeanor for a nonresident of the state to take or catch fish in
tidal waters of that state other than by "line, rod or pole held in hand."
Crabs are fish within the meaning of the statute. See· VA. CODE§ 28.1-2
(1979). VA. CODE§ 28.1-122 (1979) makes it a misdemeanor for any person other than a resident of Virginia to take or catch fish or shellfish
from Virginia waters for market or profit. Finally, it is a misdemeanor
under VA, CoDE § 1-123 (1979) for a Virginia resident who, for market
or profit, is "concerned or interested" with any nonresident in taking or
catching fish or shellfish in Virginia waters, or who knowingly permits a
nonresident to engage in any such business.
iThe Tangier Sound Waterman's Association is an unincorporated
association of about 120 commercial fishermen, all residing in
Maryland on Smith Island or in the vicinity of Crisfield on the eastern
shore of the Bay. The Association members are either full or part-time
commercial crab fishermen. The three named plaintiffs were Elmer W.

*

On June 25, 1982, Judge D. Dortch Warriner of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held
that the state statutes excluding nonresidents from catching
crabs in Virginia waters violated the privileges and immunities
clause of the United States Constitution. 6 This ruling, in view of
Virginia's decision not to appeal, opens the Chesapeake Bay
blue crab fishery to all fishermen with valid licenses, regardless
of state residency,
The Tangier Sound ruling could have a profound impact on
state licensing laws limiting access to commercial fisheries found
within state boundaries to residents of the state. This follows re·
cent court decisions applying the privileges and immunities
clause and the commerce clause to highly discriminatory state
resource management laws. 1
The law recognizes that a state has a substantial interest in the
fish and wildlife resources found within its borders. Traditionally, this interest was described in terms of "ownership" of the
resource. 3 Under the state ownership theory, discriminatory
state wildlife management practices, such as the total exclusion
of nonresidents from any access to the resources, or the imposition of exorbitant licensing fees on nonresidents, were considered immune from constitutional attack. 9 The Tangier Sound
decision signals the emergence of the privileges and immunities
clause as a legal basis for challenging residency restrictions for
commercial fisheries. This article analyzes the Tangier Sound
case in light of the traditional legal framework for state resource
mariagement and the evolution of the privileges and immunities
clause as a constitutional limitation on discriminatory state fish
and wildlife laws.
Evans, President of the Association and owner of a fishing vessel
federally licensed for the "mackerel" fishery under the Enrollment and
Licensing statutes, see 46 U.S.C. § 251 et seq. (1952 and Cum. Supp.
1982); Edwin C. Smith, III, also federally licensed; and David D. Laird,
whose crabbing skiff did not qualify for federal licensing. Tangier
Sound, 541 F. Supp. at 1289.
'\V.

WARNER, BEAUTIFUL SWIMMERS: WATERMEN, CRABS AND THE

(1976).
Tangier Sound, 541 F. Supp. at 1290.

CHESAPEAKE BAY 6
1

'Id. at 1301.
'Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Hicklin v. Orbeck,•
U.S. 518 (1978); Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 3.
(1978); Douglas v, Seacoasl Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
1
£.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled by
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); McCready v. Virginia, 94
U.S. 391 (1876); Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367
(1842).

'Mccready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 396 (1876). See also Corfield
v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825).

Tangier Sound Fishermen and Their Quarry, the
Blue Crab

component of management of the resources, both for conservation efforts and for law enforcement on the Chesapeake Bay.
The states never agreed on any form of reciprocity in their crab
laws, which would have allowed all crabbers to harvest the
resource throughout the Bay. 19

The controversy in Tangier Sound centered around a crustacean known for its agility in the water, hence its name,
Ca!linectes sapidus Rathbun, which literally means "btautiful
swimmer". 10 Because of its mobility, the blue crab is capable of
migrating great distances within its habitat, the waters of the
Chesapeake Bay and the Atlantic Ocean along the eastern
seaboard. This migratory pattern distinguishes the blue crab
from sedentary species of shellfish, which adhere to the rocks of
the Bay floor, and from free-swimming fin fish, which can range
from internal state waters of the Bay far out into the fishery
conservation zone. 11

The failure of the state legislature to act cooperatively, plus
the continued frustrations of the Maryland crabbers, led to the
suit by the Tangier Sound \Vaterman's Association following
the unsuccessful attempts by several members of the Association
to obtain Virginia crab licenses. In addition, two of the named
plaintiffs possessed federal fishing licenses, yet were still denied
the right to harvest crabs in Virginia waters on the basis of
nonresidency. 10

The typical yearly migratory cycle for the blue crab begins and
ends in the shallow waters fed by fresh tributaries in the northern reaches of the Bay in Maryland and Virginia, where the
crabs spawn, hatch larvae and feed on eelgrass and marsh
vegetation. In the fall, the male crabs move to the deep channel
in the central and southern portions of the Bay, primarily in
Virginia waters, where they sit out the winter buried in the mud
on the Bay floor. The females also migrate south, to areas near
the mouth of the Bay, to hibernate. 11 Since Maryland and
Virginia have traditionally prohibited the harvesting of crabs by
nonresidents in their respective waters, 13 commercial fishing activity by Chesapeake Bay, crabbers has been dictated by these
seasonal migrations and the more erratic changes in crab concentrations brought on by changes in salinity levels in parts of
the Bay. 14 Marylanders harvest crabs only in the summer months
when the crabs are concentrated in their waters. Unlike Virginia,
which allow.s virtually year-round harvesting, 1 5 Maryland prohibits winter dredging of hibernating crabs from the Bay floor. 16

The Parties' Arguments
The plaintiffs challenged the Virginia residency laws on the
grounds that these statutes violated the commerce clause, the
privileges and immunities clause, and the equal protection
clause of the United States Constitution. They also argued that
the Virginia laws were preempted by federal law under the
supremacy clause. The Association asked for declaratory and
injunctive relief to the defendants from enforcing the Virginia
laws and from enforcing those laws as they applied to federally
licensed vessels. 11
Virginia claimed in defense that the crab laws were an extension of the state's ownership rights in the subaqueous bottomlands from which the crabs were harvested. As part of her property right in these lands, Virginia could prohibit nonresidents
from fishing in her waters. In the alternative, Virginia argued
that it had a compelling interest in its nonresidency laws since
they were necessary for effective enforcement of the regulations
needed to protect and conserve the resource, and for preservation of the peace on the crabbing grounds. n

Virginia's residency restrictions make it Hle8aI for those
fishermen who live on the Maryland portion of Smith Island to
follow their quarry around to the Virginia side. The state line
substantially diminishes the range that larger Maryland boats

Judge \Varriner granted the plaintiffs' request for a perma~
nent injunction against enforcement of the residency laws,
holding that the Virginia statutes, "impermissibly foreclose
Marylanders from pursuing their calling as commercial crabbers
in such a way that is repugnant to the Privileges and Immunities

would normally have for fishing. While both states prohibit outof-staters from harvesting crabs within their waters, there is no
corollary prohibition against marketing the catch in either state,
or elsewhere along the eastern seaboard and around the
country. 11
Despite the mounting frustration for the fishermen and
repeated violations of the residency laws, 18 neither Maryland
nor Virginia seriously considered opening their waters to out-ofstaters to harvest blue crabs. Residency laws were an integral

1

The plaintiffs argued: I) that the Virginia residency laws created
an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 3, since the catching, selling,
processing, and transporting of crabs and crab products were actions in
the stream of commerce; 2) that the laws denied the plaintiffs their right
to pursue their livelihood in the commercial harvesting of crabs on the
basis of their nonresidency in violation of the privileges and immunities
clause, U.S. CoNST. art. IV,§ 2, cl. I; 3) that these residency restrictions
infringed on the plaintiffs' right to travel in violation of the equal protection clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ I; and 4) that the Virginia
laws were preempted by federal law under the supremacy clause, U.S.
CoNST. art. VI, § 2, to the extent that the state laws operated to exclude
federally licensed fishing vessels from Virginia waters, Brief for Plaintiff at 5, 13, 22, 28, Tangier Sound Waterman's Assoc. v. Douglas, 541
F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Va. 1982).

/d. at 6.

11

/d. at 34, 100.
Maryland has a residency requirement for commercial crabbing
licenses similar to Virginia's. M.D. ANN CooE art. 4, § 805 (1974).
11

"Tangier Sound, 541 F. Supp. at 1290.
"VA. CODE § 28.1-170 & 172 (1979).
16 Mo. ANN. CooE art. 4, § 803 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1981).

11

"Tangier Sound, 541 F. Supp. at 1289.
"The frustration created by the state residency restrictions occasionally spilled over into violence when fishermen challenged the laws
and strayed over the state boundary. The most shocking episode occurred in 1949, when a leader of the Maryland crabbers crossed the
border to fish for crabs on the Virginia side. When Virginian law
enforcement officers sought to detain his boat, the fisherman attempted
to flee to Maryland waters and was killed by the Virginian authorities.

w.

\VARNER,

BEAUTIFUL Swn,H,iERS:

CHESAPEAKE BAY

WATERMEN,

Id. at 1289. See supra note 3.

11

10
Callinectes is Greek for beautiful swimmer; sapidus means tasty
or savory in Latin; the late Dr. Mary J. Rathbun first named the blue
crab. w. WARNER, BEAUTIFUL SWIMMERS: WATERMEN, CRABS AND THE
CHESAPEAKE BAY 90 (1976).
11

iTangler Sound, 541 F. Supp. at 1291.

10

CRABS AND THE

221 (1976).
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Tangier Sound, 541 F. Supp. at 1292.

Clause of the Constitution." 1 ' He further ordered Virginia to
open its portion of the Chesapeake Bay to nonresident blue crab
fishermen as of October l, 1982. 1 '

The state ownership concept was a critical component of
Virginia's Defense in Tangier Sound, although ownership of the
exploited resource, the blue crab, was not claimed. Virginia
argued instead that it owned the subaqueous botlomlands
beneath the navigable waters within its jurisdiction, with all attendant property rights, subject only ·to the right of navigation
in the water above the lands. The commercial harvesting of the
crabs involved a physical invasion of the bottom tantamount to
a trespass. As part of the state's property right in these submerged lands, Virginia claimed that it could permit or prohibit
anyone from entering or using its property. In sum, since the
crab licensing statutes were merely an extension of Virginia's
property rights and were not an exercise of its police power, the
state could act free of federal or constitutional restraint. 19

Virginia's Ownership Claim
Five years ago, the Supreme Court in Douglas v. Seacoast
Products, Inc. is held that Virginia statutes limiting the right of
nonresidents and aliens to harvest menhaden in its territorial
waters and the Virginia portion of the Chesapeake Bay were
preemJ)ted by the federal enrollment and licensing statutes.
While it would seem that this ruling would be dispositive of the
issue presented in Tangier Sound, the Court in Douglas decided
the case on statutory grounds, thereby avoiding examination of
the constitutional challenge to Virginia's residency laws. 26
Because some of the Tangier Sound plaintiffs did not operate
federally enrolled and licensed fishing vessels, the court was required to determine the constitutionality of the state laws.

The primary case in support of Virginia's ownership claim is

McCready v. Virginia, io an I 876 Supreme Court decision upholding a Virginia statute which prohibited citizens of other
states from planting oysters in Virginia's tidal beds. The Court
ruled in favor of the state 1 against a constitutional challenge
under the privileges and immunities clause, on the ground that
Virginia "owned>! the beds, the tidewaters and even the fish,
"so far as they are capable of ownership while running. " l l Accordingly, access to fisheries remained within the sole control of
the state acting on behalf of its citizens. The state could ' 1 appropriate" the tidal beds for the exclusive use of its citizens
because such action was uin effect nothing more than a regulation of the use by the people of their common property."n

Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc. was important, however,
because it questioned the validity of the concept of state ownership of natural resources as a justification for discriminatory
state management practices. Residency restrictions were frequently upheld in cases decided during the 19th century on the
theory that the natural resources found within the borders of a
state were the common property of its citizens to be controlled
and regulated by the state for their benefit. 27 The state, in its
sovereign capacity, had the right to exercise this "ownership",
to regulate the taking of fish and wildlife. by excluding nonresidents from any interest in these common state resources. n

By basing this right on ownership, rather than citizenship, the
Supreme Court in Mccready upheld a discriminatory state law
despite the protection provided by the privileges and immunities
clause of "fundamental" interests or rights: use of-the oyster
beds of the state was not a privilege or immunity or citizenship. n

11
ld. at 1301. In response to the other three grounds for suit, the
court ruled as follows: 1) The holding on the privileges and immunities
clause made it unnecessary for the court to definitively rule on the commerce clause challenge. The court, in an extensive discussion of the
issue, commented that the plaintiffs did not establish that unharvested
crabs were articles of commerce and that there was little convincing support for the plaintiffs' claim that their interest "in traversing the state
boundary to harvest crabs (was) within the purview of the commerce
clause, either as an article of commerce or as one engaged in the
associated intercourse thereof." Id. at 1306. Only dictum cited from
Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977) supported the
plaintiffs' claim that discriminatory regulation of the taking of a
migratory fish species affected commerce in such a way as to be a
burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 1303-1306. For a different interpretation of the ''affecting commerce'' issue, as applied to regulation of
commercially harvested fish and shellfish species, see T. Lewis & I.
Strand, Jr., Douglas v. Seacoast Products; Inc.: The Legal and Economic Consequences for the Maryland Oystery, 38 Md. L. Rev. 1
(1978); 2) The court's holding on the privileges and immunities clause
encompassed federally licensed plaintiffs as well as non-licensed
fishermen, nevertheless, the plaintiffs prevailed under their federal
preemption challenge. Tangier Sound, 541 F. Supp. at 1306; 3) The
court held that ''a residency requirement uniformly applied does not
violate the (equal protection] clause in and of itself." Id.

The principle of law articulated in Mccready, and relied upon
by Virginia here are justification for its restrictive blue crab
laws, was narrowed by subsequent Supreme Court decisions
defining the scope of the commerce clause and the privileges and
immuniti~ clause as applied to state regulation of natural

people. Id. at 529. For further discussion of the state ownership theory,
see COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, THE EvolUTION OF NATIONAL \VJtolfFE LAW ch. II (1977).
11
See, e.g., Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1825), the first significant interpretation of a privileges and immunities
clause challenge to state natural resource laws. In Corfield, a New
Jersey law prohibiting nonresidents from access to oyster beds in the
state's waters was upheld under the privileges and immunities clause
and the commerce clause on the ground that the citizens of the state had
a proprietary right in their fisheries and that New Jersey could validly
use its police power to ban noncitizen~ from the use of this "common
property." Id. at 552.
HTangier Sound, 541 F. Supp. at 1292.
"94 U.S. 391 (1876).
Jl/d. at 394.
llJd. at 395.
iild. Virginia used this argument to justify the exclusion of
nonresidents from its waters:
The right of using Virginia's subaqueous lands for crabbing is not a right of a person or of a citizen as such. Il is a
part· of the property right in the Commonwealth's real
property which is below navigable waters. As the Commonwealth's property right, it is not, under any constitutional theory, required to be made available to all
residents of the United States.
Brief for Defendant at 9, Tangier Sound Waterman's Assoc. v.
Douglas, 541 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Va. 1982). For discussi9n of the
range of' 'fundamental" rights asserted to be protected by lhe privileges
and immunities clause, see infra notes 45-48 and accompanying test.

1
'Tangier Sound Waterman's Assoc. v. Douglas, No. 81-0229-R,
slip op. at 2 (E.D. Va. Jul. 29, 1982).
"431 U.S. 265 (1977).
16
Id. at 272.
11
For a thorough examination of the general theory of state
"ownership" of fish and wildlife, see Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519
(1896), oi•erruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), in
which the Supreme Court upheld a Connecticut statute prohibiting the
exportation of wild game birds killed within the state against a challenge
under the commerce clause. The Court ruled that the birds were a common property resource and that the state could regulate their taking and
sale to the point of excluding them from interstate commerce, Id. at
534. In reaching its decision, the Court traced the evaluation of the
ownership theory from fts origins in Roman and Athenian law through
its civil and common Jaw antecedents: animalsferae naturae were considered to be the comrrion property of the citizens of the state. The right
to control and regulate this common property in game was subject to
the sovereign's authority to be exercised as a trust for the benefit of the
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resources. Indeed, it appeared for a time that the ownership
theory would be entirely discredited as nothing more than a
'' 19th century legal fiction expressing 'the importance to its people that a State have the power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource', 1134 In Douglas v. Seacoast
Products, Inc., for example, Virginia argued that because the
states had a title or ownership interest in the fish swimming in
their territorial waters, they could exclude federal licensees. The
Supreme Court dismissed this claim 1 stating that:

citizens, retained broad authority to manage the exploitation of
the fish and wildlife resources found within its jurisdiction. That
the policy of federalism diminished the force of the ownership
concept did not undermine the significance of its role in the exercise of the police power of a state to conserve and protect the
resource. ' 0
Hicklin v. Orbeck, ' 1 argued one month after Baldwin, presented a unique set of facts within which to further define the
role that the state ownership theory would play when faced with
a constitutional challenge. In Hicklin, the "Alaska Hire 11 Act,
requiring all holders of state oil and gas leases, pipeline easements or right-of-way permits lo give employment preference to
Alaska residents, was held to violate the privileges and immurlities clause. The fact that Alaska owned the oil and
gas-the subject matter of the statute-did not shelter the Act
from constitutional review, and was not a justification for the
state's economic discrimination in favor of residents. Instead,
the state's ownership of the resource was "a factor-although
often the crucial factor-to be considered in evaluating whether
the statute's discrimination against noncitizens violates the
Clause."~ 1

A State does not stand in the same position as the
owner of a private game preserve and it is pure fantasy to talk of "owning" wild fish, birds, or
animals. Neither the States nor the Federal Government, any more than a hopeful fisherman or
hunter, has title to these creatures until they are
reduced to possession by skillful capture ... Under
modem analysis, the question is simply whether the
State has exercised its police power in conformity
with the federal laws and Constitution. n
Virginia claimed in Tangier Sound that its property right in
the subaqueous bottomlands where blue crabs were harvested
was distinct from the property right in the fish and wildlife at
issue in Douglas. Unlike fish and wildlife, which Douglas held
were ''owned'' by no one until reduced to possession, the lands
beneath the internal state waters of the Chesapeake Bay were
clearly owned by Virginia. The state argued that, based on
ownership, it had a legitimate right to control access to its waters
since commercial harvesting of blue crabs involved defacement
of these submerged lands; scraping for "peeler" crabs uprooted
eelgrass found on the bottom and winter dredging dug up the
soil. 36

Baldwin and Hicklin established that an ownership interest in
the resource, standing alone, would not exempt discriminatory
state resource regulation from constitutional scrutiny under the
privileges and immunities clause. However, when state control
of a natural resource conflicted with a federally protected right,
ownership of the resource would be a significant component of
the analysis, particularly where, as in Baldwin, the state demonstrated a strong conservation need.~-'

may not compel the confinement of the benefits of their resources, even
their wildlife, to their own people \\•henever such hoarding and confinement impedes interstate commerce. Nor does a State's control over its
resources preclude the proper exercise of federal power. . . . And a
State's interest in its wildlife and other resources must yield, when,
without reason, it interferes with a nonre~ident's right to pursue a
livelihood in a State other than his own, a right that is protected by the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id. at 385+386.

Rather than distinguishing the case, Judge Warriner applied
the Douglas dictum on ownership to Virginia's claim. 31 Critical
to his analysis were two recent Supreme Court cases reevaluating
the role of the ownership principle in state resource regulation.
The decisions suggested that the ownership theory was not entirely devoid of meaning or force, but in mirrowly defined cir~
cumstances could be used as a justification for privileges and immunities clause challenges to discriminatory state licensing
schemes.

0
' Id. at 384-386. See also Hllghes·v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 341
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Note, State Authority to Protect

Wildlife Preserved As Supreme Court Finally Overtums Geer v.
Connecticut, 9 ENVIRON. L Rep. 10106 (1978).
"437 U.S. 518 (1978).

In 1978, the Supreme Court in Baldwin v. Montana Fish and
Game CommissionH upheld a Montana statutory elk-hunting

HOwnership of the oil and gas resources of the state was not a key
factor in Hicklin because the Court found that Alaska had little or no
proprietary interest in much of the activity regulated by the Alaska Hire
Act. Id. at 529.

licensing scheme, which imposed substantially higher license
fees on nonresidents of the state than on residents, on the
ground that elk hunting was a recreational activity and not a
"fundamental" right protected by the privileges and immunities
clause. Basic to its holding was the Court's reaffirmation that
the state's "ownership" of, or substantial interest in, the
disputed resource was an important consideration in the constitutional analysis. Although conflicting federal interests would
circumscribe that state right, "(t)he fact that the state's control
over wildlife is not exclusive and absolute in the face of federal
regulation and certain federally protected interests does not
compel the conclusion that it is meaningless in their absence." i 9

nThe Baldwin Court emphasized that preservation of the elk
depended upon the state's conservation efforts: "The elk supply, which
has been entrusted to the care of the state by the people of Montana, is
finite and must be carefully tended in order to be preserved." Baldwin
v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371,388 (1978). To this
end, "{a)ppellants' interest in sharing this limited resource on more
equal terms with Montana residents simply does not fall within the purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.'' Id. Baldwin and Hicklin
looked to commerce clause cases for analysis of the ownership doctrine
as applied to state regulation of natural resources. As noted in Baldwin,
the privileges and immunities clause and the commerce clause both have
their source in the Articles of Confederation, art. 4. Id. at 379. The
ownership doctrine was virtually discredited in commerce clause
analysis by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332 (1979) which overruled
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896) on the ground that
"challenges under the Commerce Clause to state regulations of wild
animals should be considered according to the same general rule applied
to state regulations of other natural resources." Id. at 335. In so ruling,
the Hughes Court emphasized the importance of a state's conservation
efforts in stating that due consideration would continue to be given to
"legitimate state concerns for conservation and protection of wild
animals underlying the 19th century legal fiction of state ownership."
Id. at 336. For a thorough analysis of Hughes and Baldwin, see Note,

\Vhile rejecting the "ownership" label, Baldwin suggested
that a state, acting as a kind of 11 trustee~· on behalf of its

HDouglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977),

citing Toomer v. Witsell, 334 iJ.S. 385, 402 (1948).
HJd. at 284•285,
HBrief for Defendant at 9-10, Tangier Sound Waterman's Assoc.
v. Douglas, 541 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Va. 1982). A ''peeler" is a recent!}'
molted crab.
1
'Tangier Sound, 541 F. Supp. at 1294.

H11ghes v. Oklahoma and Baldwin \'. Fish and Game Comm '11: The
Commerce Clause and State Control of Natural Resources, 66 VA. RE\'.

"436 U.S. 371 (1978).
H(T]he States' interest in regulating and controlling those things
they claim to "own" including wildlife, is by no means absolute. States

1145 (1980) which suggests that the Supreme Court has not satisfactorily developed a unified theory governing state resource regulation.
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In Tangier Sound, the plaintiffs argued that the crab licensing
laws violated the privileges and immunities clause because the
laws denied them the right to travel freely from state to state
to pursue their livelihood. In bringing suit, the Marylanders
claimed the right to harvest crabs on the same terms as Virginia
residents, subject only to reasonable state regulation of the
resource. 49

In light of these decisions, Judge Warriner ruled in Tangier
Sound that "in the Court's analysis of a statulory scheme,
'ownership' of a natural resource is but one factor that the
Court must consider in determining whether a state has exercised its police power in conformity with federal laws and the
Constitution. '"' 1 Although the court did not explicitly weigh this
factor against competing interests in the case, the opinion clearly indicates that Virginia could not use its ownership of the subaqueous bottomlands of the Bay to insulate its discriminatory
statutory scheme from constitutional review. As in Hicklin,
where ownership was used as a screen to justify regulation that
went far beyond the state's proprietary interest in the resource,
Virginia's exclusion of nonresidents from harvesting crabs in
state waters was too broad a response to its legitimate right to
control the use of lands that it owned.

Whether state regulation violates the privileges and immunities clause depends, first, on the kind of activity that is being regulated. Baldwin established that before a state statute will
be subject to review under the privileges and immunities clause,
the asserted right involved must be "fundamental." The right of
a nonresident to earn a livelihood without being restricted by
unjustified state discrimination was determined by the Baldwin
Court to be such a fundamental right. Therefore, where the activity was commercial in nature, like the harvesting of blue crabs
for commercial marketing, state discrimination against nonresidents pursuing that activity would -be scrutinized under the
standard of review established for privileges and immunities
analysis. However, if the regulated activity was not basic to the
nonresident's livelihood, but was rather recreation or sport,
then its regulation would not fall within the purview of the
privileges and immunities clause. 10

Validity of Virginia's Residency Restrictions Under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause
In Tangier Sound, the exclusion of nonresidents from access
to crabs in Virginia waters was an integral part of the state's
regulatory scheme. Since the plaintiffs were prevented from
harvesting the resource solely because of their nonresidency, the
privileges and immunities clause, article IV, section 2, clause 1
of the United States Constitution, presented the strongest constitutional challenge to the state laws. , i

Since state action in Tangier Sound involved regulation of the
commercial taking of blue crabs, as opposed to regulation of
recreational fishing, Virginia's statutory scheme was subject to
constitutional scrutiny under the privileges and immunities
clause. The standard of review for determining whether a state
statute violated the privileges and immunities clause was
established in the 1948 case of Toomer v. Witsell, 51 in which the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a South Carolina statute
requiring nonresidents to pay license fees for shrimping in the
three-mile maritime belt off the state coast that were 100 times
greater than those paid by residents. The Court found that
South Carolina's rationale for the unequal licensing system,
conservation of its shrimp supply, did not justify the severe
discrimination practiced upon noncitizens. To pass scrutiny
under the privileges and immunities clause, the state must
establish a 'substantial' reason for the discrimination against
nonresidents beyond the fact that they are citizens of other
states, and the degree of discrimination must bear a 'close relation' to 'valid independent reasons' for the disparity of treatment. In Toomer, the purpose and effect of the statute were not
to conserve shrimp, as the state claimed, but impermissibly to
exclude nonresidents. n

The privileges and immunities clause provides that, "The
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the several States." The clause was
enacted to guarantee some degree of equality of treatment for
citizens of different states under a federalist system. H As interpreted by the courts, the primary purpose of the clause was to
''help fuse into one Nation a collection of independent,
sovereign States. It was designed to insure to a citizen of State A
who ventures into State B the same privileges which the citizens
of State B enjoy."' 1 Although the range of privileges and immunities protected by the clause is the subject of considerable
legal debate, it has been utilized by the courts to protect
residents of one state from unjustifiable discrimination when
they entered another state to engage in an essential activity, such
as the pursuit of a trade, or to exercise a basic right, such as the
institution of a court action. 43
"Tangier Sound, 541 F. Supp. at 1294. Virginia also claimed that
blue crabs were neither fixed resources, like oysters, nor free~swimming
fish, like menhaden, thereby distinguishing the case from McCready v.
Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) and Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc.,
431 U.S. 265 (1977). Judge Warriner rejected this argument, holding
that Mccready and Douglas would control, as refined by this recent line
of Supreme Court cases reevaluating the ownership concept.
;iSee, e.g., Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978); Baldwin v.
Montana Fish and Game Comm'n., 436 U.S. 371 (1978); and Toomer
v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), all involving privileges and immunities
clause challenges to state regulation of the taking of fish and wildlife
which discriminated against nonresidents.

positive or "substantive natural" rights against all government interference, e.g., Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1825); or whether it was intended to have the proscriptive effect of protecting nonresidents from unjustifiable state discrimination, see Hague
v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 511 ( 1939). A more recent interpretation, Austin
v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 660-6SI (1975) suggested that the
clause established a "norm of comity without specifying the particular
subjects as to which citizens of one State coming within the jurisdiction
of another are guaranteed equality of treatment.'' Because of the confusion over the scope of the privileges and immunities clause, it has been,
and will continue to be, applied on a case-by-case basis. L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§§ 6-32, 6-33 (1978).
"Brief for Plaintiff at 13, Tangier Sound Waterman's Assoc. v.
Douglas, 541 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Va. 1982).

HAustin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 660-661 (1975). While
the privileges and immunities clause specifically covers state "citizen·
ship," the clause also encompasses "residency" within its protection.
"Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948).

"See Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n., 436 U.S. 371,
383 (l 978):
When the Privileges and Immunities Clause has been applied to specific cases, it has been interpreted to prevent a
State from imposing unreasonable burdens on citizens of
other States in their pursuit of common callings within the
State, Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418 (1871); in the
ownership and disposition of privately held property
within the State, Blake v. McC/ung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898);
and in access to the courts of the State, Canadian North·
ern R. Co. U. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553 (1920).

1
"Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371,387
(1978): "With respect to such basic and essential activities, interference
with which would frustrate the purposes of the formation of the Union,
the States must treat residents and nonresidents without unnecessary
distinctions." But see Justice Brennan's dissent in Baldwin in which he
argues that the issue of whether a given right is "fundamental" should
not be an element of the analysis under the privileges and immunities
clause. Id. at 402 (Brennan, J. dissenting).

"334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948).
'

There has been substantial disagreement on the proper focus of the
privileges and immunities clause, i.e., whether it was designed to insure
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/d. at 396, 397.

The Court in Toomer held that discrimination against nonresidents could only be justified if nonresidents were demonstrably interfering with legitimate state objectives that could not
be remedied in less discriminatory ways. 1n each case, the inquiry under the privileges and immunities clause \vould focus on
whether there was reasonable relationship between the danger
presented by noncitizens as a class and the discrimination practiced against them. The Court concluded that South Carolina's
highly disproportionate fee system was contrary to the primary
purpose of the clause "to outlaw classifications based on the
fact of noncitizenship unless there is something to indicate that
noncitizens constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which the
statute is aimed."H

ment that law enforcement would be difficull to execute if its
waters were opened up to nonresidents: "{TJhc evil anticipated
with respect to the problem of law enforcement does appear to
lie in the fact of nonresidency itself." However, likening enforcement efforts on the water to those on the state's highways,
"where commercial traffic from all States are required to obey
Virginia traffic laws," Judge Warriner concluded that enforcement of the fishery laws on open water would be "tolerable."J7
In light of the unconstitutionality of its current laws, Judge
Warriner charged Virginia with the responsibility of enacting
new regulations for the crabbing industry which would be of
uniform application. He noted, however, that Virginia could
charge nonresidents a "reasonable and appropriately higher"
fee for their licenses. Finally, the parties were invited to submit
memoranda to the court establishing guidelines for the transition to an open fishery on the Chesapeake this fall. 58

Aware of the standard of review articulated in Toomer,
Virginia argued that it had a "compelling interest" in its
residency laws for effective enforcement of regulations
necessary to protect and conserve the resourceJ and to preserve
the peace over the crabbing grounds. The state claimed that
allowing nonresidents to fish in its waters would lead to depletion of the crab stocks through increased harvesting efforts and
would require the stiite to impose substantially higher licensing
fees to limit the number of crabbers. H

Conclusion
Tangier Sound is a classic example of the conflict between
state action and federally protected rights. The outcome in this
case, open access to the Chesapeake Bay to harvest blue crabs, is
yet another step taken by the courts in shifting the balance away
from unfettered state authority over natural resources towards
the recognition that a state has some limited responsibility for
noncitizens who wish to exploit fish and wildlife found within its
borders.

Judge \Varriner held that, contrary to the state's claim, the
severe discrimination against Maryland crabbers in excluding
them entirely from Virginia waters did not bear a close relation
to the stated conservation objectives of the statutory scheme.
The evidence did not support the claim that the exclusion of
Maryland residents per se was necessary for the conservation of
Virginia crabsJ since any harm to the fishery would be ihe result
of too many harvesters, regardless of their state of residence.
The fact that the state placed no licensing limit upon the number
of Virginians in its waters was further evidence that the state's
conservation claim was spurious. Using the complete exclusion
of nonresidents as its primary conservation method placed an
impermissible discriminatory burden on the Maryland crabbers.

The Tangier Sound case demonstrates that outright discrimination against nonresidents in the issuance of commercial licens·
ing fees and permits will be suspect, regardless of the ownership
interests of the state. Commercial fishermen must be allowed to
pursue their livelihood across state boundaries, subject only to
reasonable, nondiscriminatory state regulation. A state will,
however, continue to exercise substantial authority in utilizing
its police power to regulate and preserve the exploitation of its
natural resources, including commercial fisheries, so Jong as the
methods used are reasonably related to the stated management
objectives. Still unanswered by this case is the extent to which
the need to conserve the resources owned by the state can be
used to impose differential management schemes on noncitizens.

Virginia has endeavored through its statutes to
place almost the entire burden of conservation on
nonresidents, with no showing that they are the
source of the evil. This Virginia cannot do. A crab·
ber, whether from Maryland or Virginia, must be
free to engage in his livelihood of pursuing his
peripatetic quarry subject only to reasonable, nondiscriminatory rules related to those Virginia imposes on its citizenry. ss

Judge \Varriner's decision will have implications for other
migratory fisheries, which are regulated on a state-by-state
basis. Like the Virginia and Maryland regulation of the blue
crab fishery, states often enforce discriminatory management
practices which favor their own citizens against nonresidents.
To avoid a repetition of Tangier Sound, the states which employ
these practices should explore methods of cooperative regulation of their fisheries. Ill

Virginia also argued that an open fishery would create law enforcement problems by increasing the number of open water inspections, the degree of nonresident violators who failed to appear in its courts and the incidence of disputes among crabbers
over the fishing grounds. 56 The Judge accepted Virginia's argu-

11

Tangier Sound, 541 F. Supp. at 1301.
HTangier Sound Waterman's Assoc. v. Douglas, No. 81-0229-R,
slip op. at 2 (E.D. Va. Jul. 29, 1982).

n1d. at 398.
HBrief for Defendant at 12-14, Tangier Sound Waterman's Assoc.
v. Douglas, 541 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Va. 1982).
HTangier Sound, 541 F. Supp. at 1301. Judge Warriner noted that
the optimum sustainable yield for blue crab ha~ not yet been determined for the fishery. Blue crab landings increased from the 1880's to
the mid 1960's when landings peaked at 45,000 metric tons in 1966. In
general, landings fluctuated near the mean between 1952 and 1979. Id.
at 1290. See B. J. Rothschild, P. W. Jones, J. S. Wilson, Trends in
CheSapeake Bay Fisheries, contribution No. 1133, Center for Environmental and Estuarine Studies of the University of Maryland.
16
Brief for Defendant at 10·1 l, Tangier Sound Waterman's Assoc.
v. Douglas, 541 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Va. 1982).
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